ABSTRACT An ÒimpureÓ realism that draws extensively on non-philosophical sources has challenged mainstream political theory in recent years. These Ònew realistsÓ reject the Òpolitical moralismÓ of Òethics-firstÓ approaches, holding that theory should start from disagreement and conflict. My basic thesis is that its focus on Òthe politicalÓ and its utopophobia prevent realism from developing normative foundations that can ground social criticism. Many realists, including one of its primary progenitors, Raymond Geuss, recognize this problem. Interestingly, Geuss turns to critical theory to address this concern. While I welcome realismÕs desire to make political theory more relevant to politics, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to address the status quo bias by importing ideology critique from the Frankfurt School is ultimately unsuccessful. In my reading the critical theory of the Frankfurt School thus emerges as a more plausible approach to grounding critique of the pathologies of the present.
Introduction
Although political philosophy can often seem esoteric in its pursuit of the supposedly timeless questions of the just, the right and the good, theory inevitably responds to its social and political environment. Even the creation of a canon of Western political thought, which legitimized political theory as an area of study in the midnineteenth century, was not a disinterested intellectual endeavor. On the contrary, it
Òserved to provide an ancestry and provenance both for [Western] democratic political institutions and for the discipline of political science.Ó 1 Political theory has thus reflected broader trends outside the ivory tower ever since its creation.
With this historicist perspective in mind, it is hardly surprising that debates about distributive justice dominated the discipline with the creation of the welfare state in the postwar period. 2 The unprecedented growth in income taxes necessary to finance these new redistributive expenditures required a philosophical legitimation of taxation on wages that showed that this obligation was not Òon a par with forced labor.Ó Similarly, liberalism became the dominant theoretical paradigm after the fall of communism, when the victory of democratic capitalism seemingly foretold the Òend of history.Ó One of the most interesting thinkers seeking to address this issue is the Cambridgebased philosopher Raymond Geuss. As one of the most prominent progenitors of the new realism, Guess has sought to address the Òstatus quo biasÓ by turning to Theodor Adorno and the early Frankfurt School for inspiration. 7 While I agree that critical theory contains important resources for social criticism, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to construct a Òcritical realist theoryÓ by incorporating the Òideology critiqueÓ (Ideologiekritik) of the early Frankfurt School into contemporary realism is ultimately unsuccessful. 8 Instead of seeking to blend critical theory with realism, my basic thesis is that the Frankfurt SchoolÕs critical theory of society Ð which Òseeks to reflect society in its totalityÓ and allows for an explicitly utopian focus on ÒmanÕs emancipation from slaveryÓ Ð can better address the social pathologies of the present in all of their complexity than GeussÕs blend of realism and critical theory. 9 The argument proceeds in three basic steps. The first provides a brief exegesis of the basic contours of political realism as a movement within contemporary political philosophy. In the second section I outline GuessÕs distinctive approach to realism and its fundamental assumptions about politics as a separate, autonomous domain of life and the need to abandon utopian thinking within political theory. I then proceed to examine GeussÕs attempt to address realismÕs inadequate normative foundations by importing ideology critique from the early Frankfurt School. Although I argue that this effort is ultimately unconvincing, it points in the right direction: towards an understanding of social criticism that moves beyond the political and allows for the development of utopian evaluative criteria against which to evaluate the present. In the conclusion I argue that proponents of an impure approach to political philosophy that draws on empirical research from the other social sciences would do better to return to the older tradition of the Frankfurt SchoolÕs critical theory of society.
Defining Political Realism
As is the case with most intellectual movements, political realism subsumes a number of different positions and thinkers. In addition to Guess and his colleague ÒrealisticÓ in that it takes disagreement as given and holds that Òpolitical difference is of the essence of politics.Ó In emphasizing the inevitability of conflict (at worst) and compromise (at best), it seeks to diminish unwarranted political optimism. 13 Despite its attempts to link itself to the canon of Western political thought, a selfconsciously realist position only emerged around the turn of the second millennium. My brief reconstruction of realism shows that its emphasis on politics and broadly ÒutopophobicÓ sensibility are closely tied together by its focus on conflict and disagreement. 20 Although most realists treat this anti-utopian focus on politics as obvious and self-explanatory, in reality these presuppositions ground a thick account of politics and the nature of reality that contains many unwarranted (or at least undertheorized)
assumptions. This causes a number of theoretical and methodological problems, including the issue of a status quo bias. In the next section I show how Guess has tried to address these issues by developing his own somewhat heterodox approach to realism. I then proceed to argue that neither these changes nor his importation of ideology critique from the Frankfurt School successfully address these issues. Geuss talks about realism as an approach to Òpolitical philosophy,Ó it seems like he is actually constructing a broader approach to social theory that is supposed to be realist in the sense that it focuses on the Òreal motivationÓ of individuals, not on the construction of ideal types. 24 While GeussÕs adaptation of realism is logical in many ways, I worry that moving in this direction sacrifices realismÕs distinctiveness vis-ˆ-vis other forms of social and political theory.
GeussÕs Position within Realism
In addition to this problem, GeussÕs modifications of the assumption about the political also raise questions about the kinds of conclusions he can draw. Most notably, it undermines realismÕs ability to answer Òquestions that have the form ÔWhat is to be done?,ÕÓ which Guess himself argues is one of the key tasks of political theory. While some of GuessÕs defenders have noted that his philosophy actually seeks Òto operate criticism in political theory at a higher level of self-reflectionÓ that is not supposed to be action-oriented and -orienting, I think that we should take Geuss at his word when he says that it is Òentirely justified to expect help from political philosophy with practical 39 This stands in stark contrast to KantÕs understanding of morality, where coercion would be misplaced as moral action is defined precisely by the fact that it is entered into freely out of a sense of duty and an understanding of the moral law. While I recognize the dangers of both overly utopian and moralistic thinking, I am more concerned that political realism undermines the force of its claims by confusing idealism with abstract normative reasoning that can still relate to concrete issues of politics. 42 It also risks confusing a possibly welcome pessimism that Òbrings us to curb our political hopes and ambitionsÓ with a conservative focus on Òwhat is (allegedly) fixed
rather than on what is changeable.Ó 43 The problem of realismÕs anti-utopianism Ð along with its a priori assumptions about the autonomy and conflictuality of politics Ð make it difficult for this movement to convincingly critique the pathologies of the existing social and political order.
Critical Theory and Ideology Critique
In the previous section I some problemÕs with 49 Geuss argues that doing this requires an ÒimpureÓ approach to political philosophy that draws extensively on history to suss out the real motivations of individuals at any given time.
In making this move, Geuss draws explicitly on the writings of the early Frankfurt School. However, much like his relationship to realism, his reading of critical theory is also rather unorthodox. For example, within the critical theory tradition, this ÒseparationÓ between real and ideological needs is achieved through attempts to Òsave the utopian Geuss has in mind in his reconstruction of ideology critique. 57 However, while this form of categorical social criticism can elucidate the internal contradictions within existing forms of legitimation, it has little to say about the shape of potential future changes; that is, it is a purely negative form of social criticism that cannot undergird positive political conclusions or judgments.
The narrower remit of categorical critique poses a problem for Guess. In order to shift from negative criticism to a more positive form of social critique that can reflect on the concrete shape of future transformations necessitates the shift to the second, normative stage. This dimension of immanent critique builds on the contradictions identified through categorical criticism, turning the attention of the theorist to the broader norms governing the system as a whole. Whereas categorical critique spotlights the internal problems generated by the concepts used to understand politics, normative criticism turns the focus onto the basic norms underpinning society understood as a totality, i.e. Òa comprehensive system, or hierarchy, of all beings, including man and his aims.Ó 58 Doing so requires a broader, normative account of the goals or criteria that should or would govern a better world.
Geuss resists the move to this deeper normative plane of positive criticism due to his commitment to contextualism and his rejection of ethics-first approaches. Instead, he seeks to Òdistinguish the good and the better from the less good, the bad and the unbearableÓ by relying on a theory of contextual judgment that focuses on Òthe relationship between power and legitimation, and the ways in which one is brought to bear on the other.Ó 59 However, it is unclear that this is actually possible without importing (or smuggling in) certain values that reclaim the real world Òand ensure that reality, or even produce it, through the very act of critique.Ó In other words, in order to make positive political judgments one must still have some guiding criteria or principles to ensure the semblance of consistency and prevent the analysis from being completely arbitrary (willkŸrlich). Without specifying some ideal, some goal or some criteria by which to judge the present political order, Geuss leaves himself without any standard by which to justify its own conclusions. Echoing the views of many philosophers, Benhabib points out that utopian thinking is necessary to fulfill political theoryÕs aim of Òarticulating the normative principles of democratic action and organization in the present.Ó 60 Geuss seems to be aware of this problem, but tries to skirt around it by narrowing the scope of his theory considerably. Speaking of realism as a Òbroad church,Ó he notes that this approach cannot Òensure that the political judgements any one person or group of people makes at any given time will be wise, humane and enlightened. Indeed, it will not even guarantee that judgement will be careful, informed and well grounded.Ó This statement makes it unclear what exactly realism can actually accomplish. In the end, all
Geuss can do is to note that Òjudgement is a kind contextual activity for which any such guarantees are lacking, and that nothing is gained by pretending they could exist when they patently do not.Ó
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While Geuss deserves credit for this strikingly frank admission, this very reduced form of realism does not seem to be able to provide any guidance at all for how our judgments should be formed (through thought, research, deliberation, communication,
etc.) or informed (by principles, criteria, guidelines and so on). 62 In his attempt to resist providing any prepolitical blueprints for society or principles about how it should work, What is even more problematic given realismÕs shared assumptions about Òthe autonomy, or at least the semi-autonomy, of the politicalÓ is that many of these problems may not be resolvable at the level of politics, or at least not at the level of political alone. 68 For example, the inability to politics to address certain basic economic problems After all, such a presupposition would run counter to Òa theory which attributes a temporal core to truth,Ó i.e. to critical theoryÕs own commitment to contextualism. 73 By contrast, the fact that Guess posits a version of Òthe primacy of the politicalÓ as a methodological a priori is surprising precisely because it claims to advocate Òa greater appreciation of the historical contexts in which political decision-making and action takes place.Ó Politics may indeed be predominant in Òspecific cultural and historical circumstances.Ó However, there is no reason to assume ahead of time that this will always be the case, or that all problems that appear within politics are best addressed (or even can be addressed) exclusively or even primarily through political means. 74 Although realismÕs turn to critical theory to rescue itself from the status quo bias has real potential, I argue that GeussÕs attempt to do so is ultimately unsuccessful because of his overly narrow focus on the political and his rejection of utopian thinking. Although
Geuss has sought to walk back these assumptions, this response threatens to undermine the distinctiveness of realism as an approach to political philosophy. In this sense, Geuss and the other political realists finds themselves in the horns of a dilemma. They must either embrace realismÕs status as a Burkean intervention that stresses the magnificence of political order as an extraordinary achievement, or they must sacrifice its claims to novelty and its challenge to the Òhigh liberalismÓ of mainstream political theory.
Concluding Thoughts
Over the course of this essay, I have argued that while political realismÕs engagement with the problems and pathologies of the present is a welcome development, its narrow focus on the political and its rejection of utopian thinking are highly My suggestion that critical theory is a better model for ÒimpureÓ theory that can meaningfully address the pathologies of the present by engaging with resources outside political philosophy does not necessarily mean that realism is not useful or that it does not have a role to play within contemporary political philosophy. In fact, a cogent division of theoretical labor might exist between political realism and critical theory.
Given its focus on the fundamental importance of providing political order, it may be that realism is most applicable to problems dealing with the lack of such order, such as civil war and terrorism. Zeroing in on cases where breakdown of politics has forced individuals to recreate institutions and regimes for the peaceful resolution of conflict fulfills political realismÕs methodological presuppositions. It may therefore make sense to think in realist terms when it comes to certain Ò[e]vents at the beginning of the twentyfirst century, in particular the terrorist atrocities in New York, Madrid, and London.Ó 77 By contrast, as a result of its interdisciplinary focus and its utopian attempts to reflect on how the pathologies of the present might be overcome, the remit of critical theory may be somewhat different. At a time when global politics has been roiled by the greatest economic collapse since the Great Depression, it may be that we once again have to address the problems of society as a totality, not merely by looking at politics, economics, culture or psychology in isolation. 78 As a result of its openness to ÒnewÓ thinking about contemporary social problems without regard for clear disciplinary boundaries, critical theory is better positioned to diagnose whether the crisis of the present is indeed the result of social pathologies that cut across politics, economics, culture and psychology, and to consider possible Òanticipatory-utopianÓ responses to these issues.
Despite their differences, political realism and critical theory also have much in common. As two differing approaches to Òimpure,Ó empirically engaged political theory that look beyond philosophy for their inspiration and data, realism and critical theory can serve as models for renewed collaboration between theoretical and empirical approaches to politics. As can be seen in the predominance of departments of Òpolitical science,Ó positivist approaches dominate the disciple today. This fact has resulted in the marginalization of political theory, as most political scientists focus on quantitative cause-and-effect descriptions of political phenomena (the same can be said of the status of theory in other social scientific disciplines as well).
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These ongoing trends signal a deep disagreement about the role that political theory should play in the empirical study of politics. In contrast to calls for political theory to become Òa source of ontological illuminationÓ that focuses on Òwhat positive political science complicatedly is,Ó both political realism and critical theory provide models of how empirical and normative research can be brought together to form productive synergies. 80 This is most clearly visible in the first stage of these two approaches to
ÒimpureÓ theorizing, where practitioners of both seek to gain an empirical understanding of the concrete problems at hand. Thus, instead of starting with abstract models or utopian assumptions regarding human cooperation, they start with events on the ground, often borrowing from the research of their empirical Ð often even quantitatively oriented Ð colleagues down the hall.
Despite their important methodological and canonical differences, both political realism and critical theory bridge the empirical/normative divide. For both of these movements, the relationship between political science and political theory should transcend this distinction by being ontological, descriptive and normative at the same time. 81 As a result, political realism and critical theory can act as models for students of politics at a time when the divide between political theory and empirical political science has arguably never been greater or more damaging to our attempts to understand the crises and pathologies of the present.
